The devastating fallout of the joint US-Israeli war on Iran is spreading rapidly across the region and world. Meanwhile, one name continues to emerge in Western media discussions of a ‘credible’ alternative to the regime, particularly following the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 28 February.
Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran’s last monarch who ruled until the 1979 revolution, has been living in exile, primarily in the US, since he was a teenager. Through regular media appearances, the 65-year-old has positioned himself as a secular democratic alternative to the Khamenei dynasty, oscillating between a constitutional monarch-in-waiting and a non-ideological transitional figure willing to support a future referendum.
‘They trust me as a transitional leader,’ he told 60 Minutes in a tearful interview on 3 March, adding that people have been ‘calling my name by the millions on the streets of Iran’.1
Appearances by his mother, former empress Farah Pahlavi, on Israeli television in January have reinforced the perception of a royal family positioned for imminent return.2
This tragic narrative has been amplified mostly by segments of the Iranian diaspora who often carry his image and wave the pre-revolution flag at protests globally, while peddling the same pro-war sentiment as rightwing American and expatriate Persian-language media. While many in the post-revolution emigrant community remain nostalgic for the monarchy, others are deeply critical of it, making diaspora spaces themselves politically fragmented and often sharply divided.
In 1979, millions of Iranians from working, secular and intellectual classes took to the streets as part of the Islamic Revolution, a popular uprising that culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many revolutionaries and diasporic generations today view the new theocracy under Khamenei as a betrayal of their demands for liberalism and secularism. Indeed, the regime has devoted itself to quelling dissent, and organized opposition groups that also competed for power in 1979, including the Marxist Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) and Kurdish militias, remain deeply unpopular.
But Pahlavi’s sudden elevation in the media reveals less about his support among broader Iranian society than it does about the West’s enduring search for a simplified, internationally legible narrative for Iranians’ opposition to decades of authoritarian rule and the rapid erosion of living standards due to Western sanctions and inflation. Inside the country, however, historical memory, economic anxiety and skepticism towards dynastic politics complicate the story.
To understand this moment, we can look to the 2022 protests, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the morality police. These protests quickly evolved into nationwide demonstrations that extended beyond compulsory dress codes to wider grievances about political accountability, civil liberties, and economic hardship. The state’s response was forceful: security crackdowns, mass arrests, internet restrictions, and reports by international human rights organizations of significant casualties among protesters – much like what we have seen since the December 2025 protests that led up to the US-Israeli war on Iran and saw thousands of Iranians killed.3
In the absence of a unified domestic leadership structure, external observers increasingly looked for a singular political figure who could symbolize a palatable transition for the West. It is from this vacuum that Pahlavi’s profile grew.
Pahlavi offers clarity: an English- and French-speaking, Western-oriented personality who fits familiar cultural templates of mild-mannered obedience. In the context of the current war, with the mounting civilian death toll and direct targeting of schools, hospitals, energy infrastructure and public spaces, the urge to impose a simple solution on a complex and violent reality grows stronger.
The pattern in this case is not unique. In recent decades, Western governments have often gravitated towards personalized alternatives as shorthand for complex societies undergoing upheaval – from Ahmed Chalabi in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to the establishment of the National Transitional Council in Libya following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.
Political change is filtered through collective memory – and for many communities, modernization is associated with coercion rather than consent
But Iran is not merely a modern state navigating contemporary tensions; as one of the ancient cradles of civilization, it is a society shaped by layers of history. Political change is filtered through collective memory – and for many communities, modernization is associated with coercion rather than consent.
My grandfather, still alive, witnessed the 1960s military campaign led by the Iranian state in the Boyer Ahmad region during what became known as the Gajestan conflict. A central pillar of the ‘White Revolution’ of modernization and land reform under Mohammad Reza Shah in the early 1960s was the dismantling of traditional landholding structures to consolidate state authority. In regions such as Boyer Ahmad and parts of southern Iran, tribal communities resisted what they perceived as forced dispossession of land and pastoral rights. The confrontation escalated into armed clashes where the state deployed military units and air force against tribal groups. Civilian casualties remain part of local memory and for many Iranians beyond elite urban circles, the Gajestan conflict reinforced the perception that modernization was imposed through state force rather than negotiated consent.
If historical memory shapes skepticism, then modern political behaviour reinforces it. Over the past decade, Pahlavi’s public posturing has shifted, raising questions about his democratic credentials, particularly given the authoritarian legacy of the monarchy. He has expressed willingness to cooperate broadly with reformist figures inside Iran, emphasizing opposition to foreign military intervention on nationalist grounds, and at other times appeared sympathetic to strategies of external pressure.4,5 His alignment with Israel and engagement with Western political figures including Donald Trump, whom he praised as ‘the most celebrated foreign leader’ and Nigel Farage, who has publicly supported regime change in Tehran, provide clues as to his style of governance and create unease inside Iran. Notable too are Pahlavi’s expressions of sympathy for Western casualties in the current conflict, contrasted with his perceived silence on Iranian civilian deaths, including the 165 school girls in Minab likely killed by a US air on the first day of the war.4 In exile politics, strategic repositioning may be tactical, but in a society marked by rupture and distrust, consistency is a prerequisite for credibility.
Beyond a media presence, there is also limited evidence of an organized domestic network or any detailed socio-economic roadmap tied to Pahlavi’s platform. Much of his support appears to be concentrated among diaspora personalities rather than constituencies rooted inside the country. In an environment where trust is scarce and mobilization carries significant risk, symbolism is not a substitute for structure.
Any political alternative that foregrounds cultural reform without articulating a credible economic pathway will not resonate with broader segments of Iranian society
Yet the West often employs cultural symbolism, most notably the hijab as the central axis of Iranian political discontent.6 Dress codes for women in particular are undeniably contested in Iran, but social practice in many urban spaces has evolved in complex and uneven ways. Reducing societal grievances to a single cultural marker obscures the material realities shaping daily life. Inflation, currency volatility, unemployment and the cumulative impact of sanctions exert far more immediate pressure on households. Any political alternative that foregrounds cultural reform without articulating a credible economic pathway will not resonate with broader segments of Iranian society.
None of this constitutes an endorsement of the status quo. Iranian society is critical, diverse and politically engaged. The grave threats facing Iranians today mean that, more than ever, the country’s political future must be shaped by material conditions, collective memory and the lived experiences of those navigating uncertainty, danger and destruction on the ground. Political futures cannot be inherited or imposed; they must be constructed from within. Legitimacy cannot be televised into existence.
- 60 Minutes, ‘Prince Reza Pahlavi’s extended 60 minutes interview’, 3 March 2026, a.nin.tl/60minutes
- i24News English, ‘Exclusive interview: Former Empress of Iran, Farah Pahlavi discusses the resistance, 9 February 2026, a.nin.tl/farahpahlavi
- Amnesty International, ‘What happened at the protests in Iran?’, 26 January 2026, a.nin.tl/iranprotests
- ‘Reza Pahlavi doesn’t care about the little girls #iran’ @sharghzadeh, a.nin.tl/minab
- Scott Simon, ‘Why the hijab is at the center of protests in Iran,’ NPR, 1 October 2022, a.nin.tl/axis
- VOA, ‘Former Crown Prince appears on VOA…’ 17 March 2011, a.nin.tl/VOA
- Al Jazeera, ‘Reza Pahlavi pledges to “make Iran great again” at 2026 CPAC conference’, a.nin.tl/cpac
